4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

All authority was vested in the hands of the Commander of *Heeresgruppe Kiev*, Field-Marshal Eichhorn. To Kiev was sent also General Groener, who had a great reputation for his organizing capacity (amongst his collaborators was 'enigmatic' Meissner, who later was to play a certain role in the entourages of President Hindenburg and of the Führer Hitler). The representative of the German Foreign Office was Baron Mumm. Vienna sent as minister Count Forgacs, who, as minister in Belgrad in 1914, had his share of responsibility for the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war.

Dissensions began between the Allies from the very first moment. Hoffmann, who was in Kovno, kept himself well-informed about what was going on in Kiev. He wrote in his diary: 'Endless troubles with the Austrians in Ukraine. They are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. It is a pity that the Italians do not attack.' Quarrels broke out on account of the delimitation of the respective German and Austrian zones. The role of the Austrians in the advance into the Ukraine had been modest enough, since they arrived too late to take part in any operations with the exception of 'the capture' of Odessa. Nevertheless, their zone of occupation spread over all the south. At the end of March an agreement was at last reached. On the Black Sea the Austrians retained Odessa and Kherson; the Germans Nikolaev and Sevastopol. Three Governments, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Podolia and the southern strip in Volhynia, were reserved as the Austrian zone. In this wise, the Crimea, which shortly passed into German hands, was separated by the Austrian zone from the rest of the territories in German occupation.

The gradual advance eastward of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* continued. The 22nd Reserve Corps remained in Volhynia: the 27th Reserve (Saxon) Corps was in Kiev: the 41st Reserve Corps, after crossing the Dniepr, occupied the Government of Chernigov, the 20th Army Corps that of Poltava: the 1st Army Corps marched into Kharkov on 20 April. General Groener, who was concerned to collect coal supplies, gave the order in May for the 215th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to march into the south-east into the Donets coal basin as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack region, where an independent Government had been set up. At the same time the 212th Infantry Division occupied Melitopol and the northern part of the Government of Tauris, while the 15th Landwehr Division was sent to the Crimea and Sevastopol. By the middle of May the occupation had been accomplished.

The Government of the *Rada* had returned to Kiev with the German troops. An interesting light is thrown on the characters of

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645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517 [645] Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669] and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642 munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661] as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423 tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation.[1] 369 It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor. 423 427

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before. 185 423

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these years of reconstruction[1] to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine. [645]

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended. [452]

[1] [During NEP -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy. 185 471

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new currency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold standard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell. 185 652 435

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government. 642 665 645

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

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642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt themselves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.

665 645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved,[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, 1919 - -Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else. 665

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers. 661

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity. 631

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 631 642 645

631 642 645 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications, Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 327 185 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 241 185 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921, which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the

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186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
666 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain. The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

● 645 In 1925, he was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1923 -- Analyst]

[Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state.

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly.

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 871 186 665 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an independent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 186 665 He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648] which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

645 871 186 665 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the Russian influence was strongest.

At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time. 731

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories. 841 645 631

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in 433

1/1 [1929 - All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 --Analyst]

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, ooo could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. 661 558 He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his [645] post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

erected. We recognize Mr. Iaroslav Stets'ko as Head of the State Administration of the Ukraine.[17] 668* 642

The pastoral letter was read over the radio by Father Hryn'okh the same morning. It appears to have removed any doubts which may have been lingering in the minds of most of the prominent Ukrainians in L'vov concerning the authenticity of the Stets'ko government.

The Bandera leaders went ahead rapidly to consolidate their victory. They felt the need of a name which would carry greater prestige than that of the young enthusiast Stets'ko, who had, as Bandera's deputy, already declared himself chief of state. Consequently, they prevailed upon the aged Constantine Levits'kyi, who had been released from prison several months before the war broke out, to accept the post of president of a parliament or Council of Seniors. At the same time, the Bandera group prepared to establish a "cabinet," which was to have included men from a wide group of parties. Stets'ko himself was to be "premier," since he feared that a nonparty man might give way to German pressure. Bandera adherents were to be placed in such key posts as deputy war minister, which was to be held by Shukevych; minister of security, to be held by Lebed'; and minister of political coordination, to be held by Klymiv.[18] 668* 642, 645

The Bandera government, however, was not to live long enough to bring these plans to fruition. The proclamation of the government in the Prosvita hall had deeply disturbed the Wehrmacht officers who had organized "Nachtigall." They knew that it would induce a violent reaction among the ruling Nazis in Berlin, whereas the Wehrmacht group had hoped that by careful procedure they could secure the gradual development of a friendly, autonomous Ukrainian regime, at least in Galicia, without high party circles' realizing what was happening. Some of them were also alarmed at the possibility that the wide publica- 668*

[17] This quotation is taken from a contemporary leaflet copy of the pastoral letter.

[18] Interview 24; Mirchuk, pp. 35–36. Mirchuk lists Petriv as war minister, while a contemporary German SD report (NO 4529) has Iarii in that post. The same report lists Klymiv as minister of security, but the evidence available to me makes it appear probable that Lebed' held the post; possibly the latter's clandestine role made it necessary to keep his appointment secret.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

as a base for the new Government which had to replace the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Government, from which the politicians were excluded, would be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

[1] In French in the original text.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

642 and "every republic of the Union has its constitution which takes into consideration the peculiarities of this republic..."; and Article 17 which avers that "every republic of the Union retains the right of voluntary withdrawal from the USSR" is merely an empty phrase, for the laws of the entire Bolshevik realm have equal power in all the federated republics and take precedence over the laws of the federated republics. Anyone who would dare to put into effect in his federated state the "right of voluntary withdrawal" from the Union, would be presented with Article 133 of the same Constitution, which says: "Defending his country is the /122/ most sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason like violating an oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military forces of the state and espionage will be avenged as the greatest crime with all the force of the law." If it should occur to a Ukrainian to agitate for the right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union of his federated republic, which is "guaranteed" him in Article 17, Article 123 could be cited to prevent him from doing so, which makes punishable "any propaganda of a racial or nationally exclusive nature".

642 Now, what is the "independent exercise of
• 645 supreme power" in the Ukraine like? Article 77 of the Constitution[1] clarifies this point, the People's Commissariats of Moscow are alone competent in matters pertaining to defense, foreign policy, foreign trade, traffic, the entire postal system, heavy industry and defense industry. But since the Constitution went into effect further commissariats of the Federated Republics have been subordinated to the Moscow offices, so that only education, local industry, municipal economy and social welfare have remained in Ukrainian hands. These are subject to the supervision of the national office. Under such circumstances it does not matter how the administrative system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is built up,

1 [i.e. of November 1936 – Analyst]

642 645 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

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871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[1] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

[1] [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930- Analyst]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 36. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
644 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR shall have formed a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 37. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 Art. 38. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR appoints the Government
[644] of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 39. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Ukrainian SSR is the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 40. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 41. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 42. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR are binding throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorised representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Ukrainian SSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for economic and cultural affairs;

g) Directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Exercises guidance in the sphere of the relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, on the basis of the general procedure established by the USSR governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign states.

Art. 44. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of regional Soviets of Working

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

645 People's Deputies and likewise to suspend decisions and orders of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul orders and instructions of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 45. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, namely:
- The Minister of Motor Transport
- The Minister of Internal Affairs
- The Minister of State Control
- The Minister of State Security
- The Minister of the Housing Construction Industry
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs
- The Minister of the Armed Forces
- The Minister of Cinematography
- The Minister of the Municipal Economy
- The Minister of Light Industry
- The Minister of Forestry
- The Minister of the Timber and Paper Industry
- The Minister of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
- The Minister of the Local Fuel Industry
- The Minister of Local Industry
- The Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry
- The Minister of Education
- The Minister of Public Health
- The Minister of the Building Materials Industry
- The Minister of State Farms
- The Minister of the Fish Industry
- The Minister of Agriculture
- The Minister of Social Maintenance
- The Minister of Trade
- The Minister of Finance
- The Minister of the Food Industry
- The Minister of Justice

The Chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions;
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
The Chief of the Administration of Higher Education.

Art. 46. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 47. The Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are either Union-Republican or Republican Ministries.

Art. 48. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Union-Republican Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR:
- The Ministry of Internal Affairs
- The Ministry of State Control
- The Ministry of State Security
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Ministry of the Armed Forces

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The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice

Art. 49. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Art. 50. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective Ministries, issue orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministries of the USSR, and verify their execution.

Art. 51. Each Union-Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR entrusted to it, with the exception of only a limited number of enterprises, according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and is subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the corresponding Union-Republican Ministry of the USSR.

Art. 52. Each Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 53. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR or a Minister of the Ukrainian SSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR within a period not exceeding three days.

Chapter V. The Local Organs of State Power

631 Art. 54. The organs of state power in regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 55. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, districts in big cities, settlements and villages are elected by the

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[637] 646 [645] Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

631 [652] Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262

(a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

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The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

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UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union UKRAINE RD1

Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commissariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi-national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total population of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a